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GEORGE I. LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS TALK IN 
1939 AMERICA (2012). Pp. 280. Hardcover $85.00. 
 
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS 
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A 
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES (2012). Pp. 336. Hardcover $65.00. 
 
Narratives of American constitutional development tend to treat old ways of think-
ing about constitutional meaning as if they are inevitably wrapped into new ones. In the-
se accounts, even when one idea gives rise to its very opposite, the old idea lives on as a 
foil, reflecting the wisdom of our reformed approach. Yet some constitutional ideas 
simply die out. These lost ways of thinking about the Constitution reveal the contingency 
and limitations of the conceptions that did develop. For instance, Mark Graber’s study of 
the transformation of the meaning of free speech,1 Ken Kersch’s account of discontinui-
ties in American understandings of civil liberties,2 and Risa Goluboff’s description of the 
Civil Rights Movement’s forsaken commitment to economic equality3 have all helped to 
demonstrate that the scope and nature of the rights we ended up with are only a small 
sliver of the constitutional rights of which Americans once conceived. They document 
that significant insights and important commitments have been lost along the way. 
George Lovell and Ronald Krotoszynski have offered two recent and valuable ad-
ditions to the scholarship on lost, or neglected constitutional rights. Krotoszynski looks 
at the history of the right to petition and to use public space for mass protests.4 He urges 
Americans to rediscover or “reclaim” the First Amendment’s neglected right to petition 
so that the judiciary can better protect this form of political action.5 Lovell identifies a 
neglected rights tradition in popular petitions for civil rights created before the Civil 
Rights Movement, by mining the archives of the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights 
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 2.  KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004).  
 3.  RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).  
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Section (“CRS”).6 Lovell examines 879 letters to the CRS, written in 1939 and 1940, and 
unearths remarkably poignant requests for federal government intervention and a surpris-
ing array of rights claims and expressions of political protest.7 Each work successfully 
complicates an established scholarly view of American rights. 
Lovell approaches the letters at the core of his intriguing book from a position of 
respect for and sympathy with their authors. He explains in the acknowledgment section 
that he was drawn to these letters as soon as he discovered them,8 and that fascination is 
evident in his close reading and in-depth analysis of their content and their lessons for 
socio-legal scholars. Lovell devotes an early chapter to the legal and political context of 
the CRS, sketching its origins and the constraints under which it operated.9 The next 
three chapters describe the letters’ subject matter, the legal and constitutional arguments 
they contained, and the extralegal strategies they employed to enhance their persuasive-
ness.10 Throughout, his analysis highlights the sophisticated political and rhetorical 
moves of their authors. 
Lovell frames his examination around the left-leaning critiques of “rights talk” that 
emerged (or perhaps re-emerged) in the 1990s.11 One such critique, often associated with 
Mary Anne Glendon, is that legal claims are inherently atomizing, encouraging or even 
forcing people to pursue their own individual entitlements, pitting them against other in-
dividual rights holders, and eclipsing concerns about the common good.12 This is Not 
Civil Rights does a masterful job of demonstrating that rights politics need not take this 
form. Lovell points out that the letter writers in his study were actually more likely to 
frame their claims in terms of shared harms and community responsibilities than they 
were to make claims solely about their own entitlements.13 In fact, they often attempted 
to bolster their requests for help from the CRS by arguing that attention to their case 
could also help the many others who were in a similar position.14 One man, who had 
been beaten by railroad police in Florida, urged the federal government to intervene by 
explaining that others had experienced similar treatment and that bringing the wrongdo-
ers to justice would prevent further harms.15 Others, protesting the denial of their right to 
vote, explained that they were concerned with the functioning of the democratic system, 
not merely with their own individual ballots.16 The book offers many additional exam-
ples of letters that linked rights claims to concern for the common good, and makes it 
clear that their authors did not forsake majoritarian politics or community mindedness 
when they framed their concerns as rights or sought their protection. 
Another criticism of rights talk is that it reifies elite, lawyerly ideas, cabining the 
kinds of demands for change that people can make within it, and legitimating the status 
                                                	   6.	  	   GEORGE	  I.	  LOVELL,	  THIS	  IS	  NOT	  CIVIL	  RIGHTS:	  DISCOVERING	  RIGHTS	  TALK	  IN	  1939	  AMERICA	  (2012).	  	   7.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   8.	  	   Id.	  at	  xv.	  	   9.	  	   Id.	  at	  30.	  	   10.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	   11.	  	   Id.	  at	  10-­‐13.	  	   12.	  	   Id.	  at	  10;	  see	  MARY	  ANN	  GLENDON,	  RIGHTS	  TALK:	  THE	  IMPOVERISHMENT	  OF	  POLITICAL	  DISCOURSE	  (1991).	  	   13.	  	   LOVELL,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  11.	  	   14.	  	   Id.	  at	  135-­‐37.	  	   15.	  	   Id.	  at	  137-­‐38.	  	   16.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  103-­‐05.	  
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 49 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/15
2013]	   LOST	  RIGHTS	   423	  
quo.17 Here again, the content of letters to the CRS complicates this critique.18 Although 
their authors typically lacked legal training and often lacked any formal education, they 
were undeterred from making novel rights claims and, with a few exceptions, not intimi-
dated by the framework within which they were attempting to operate.19 On the contrary, 
they drew from phrases in both the Constitution and Declaration of Independence to 
make a wide variety of bold and creative rights claims.20 While some grounded their ar-
guments in particular points of legal knowledge, many drew on provisions that would 
have had narrower meanings for those with legal training.21 For instance, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, which legal elites understand to have 
been largely emptied of content, struck many of the letter writers as a promising source 
for rights not otherwise specified in the text of the Constitution.22 One particularly 
poignant note is how many of the letter writers described the need for federal govern-
ment intervention to address state-level rights violations.23 Although this role for the fed-
eral government would come to be widely recognized as constitutionally permissible and 
even necessary, at the time of their writing, these arguments failed to sway federal offi-
cials.24 As Lovell points out, the fact that these claims were ahead of their time demon-
strates that the content of rights claims is not automatically restricted by calculations 
about what judges will find immediately persuasive.25 
Indeed, one of the many strengths of Lovell’s study is that it separates out the forg-
ing of rights claims from the pursuit of litigation. In fact, this study of isolated letter 
writers fills a gap in the literature on rights-based mobilization, which tends to focus on 
movements rather than individuals, and in particular, movements centered on litigation.26 
It seems possible, however, that the standard critiques of rights rhetoric may really be 
applicable, not to the use of rights talk generally, but rather to the use of rights-based lit-
igation. Could it be that the pursuit through litigation is what circumscribes rights-based 
claims and canalizes them into recognized channels? If so, rights-based litigation move-
ments might well be subject to the limitations that the critics of rights politics describe. 
It also seems possible that the Civil Rights Movement may have forged such a 
strong connection between the idea of rights and that of judicial enforcement that the cri-
tique has more power in the context of today’s politics than it did in the period Lovell 
examined. Is one consequence of the Civil Rights Movement’s successes that rights 
claims are now so strongly associated with litigation that they are crafted to appeal to 
judges in ways that earlier rights claims, claims never intended to be litigated, were not? 
Lovell’s study points to these questions, but because it only examines letters written in 
1939 and 1940, it must leave them for another to answer. 
                                                	   17.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  33.	  	   18.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  34,	  192-­‐95.	  	  	   19.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	   20.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  122-­‐23.	  	   21.	  	   Id.	  at	  135.	  	   22.	  	   Id.	  at	  119.	  	   23.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  201.	  	   24.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  68,	  201.	  	   25.	  	   Id.	  at	  112.	  	   26.	  	   Id.	  at	  17.	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Through its close reading of individual letters, This Is Not Civil Rights does an un-
usually good job of addressing the “myth of rights,”27 the idea that rights rhetoric so daz-
zles Americans that they believe in rights as an idealized fixative for injustice, or in Lov-
ell’s words, the idea that people “mistake legal ideals for reality.”28 At first blush, 
Lovell’s account seems to offer some support for this proposition. After all, those who 
wrote to the CRS expressed an implicit, and often explicit, faith in the law and constitu-
tional rights as a vehicle through which wrongs would be righted. But the CRS rarely in-
tervened on behalf of the letter writers. One might easily conclude that these letter writ-
ers exhibited faith in the existence of meaningful constitutional protections, which, when 
called upon, proved merely fictitious. Yet Lovell reads these letters not as evidence of 
people’s misguided faith in the myth of rights, but as evidence of their clear-eyed view 
of the political system and their competence at navigating it.29 Lovell interprets the letter 
writers’ expressions of faith in the law as a strategic device, and highlights several other 
strategic devices that letter writers used in conjunction with it.30 For instance, the letter 
writers made extra-legal claims alongside their legal ones, often emphasizing the worthi-
ness of their cases or the extremity of their need.31 They did not seem to think a rights 
claim alone would garner a response or that legally acceptable outcomes were therefore 
morally legitimate.32 In fact, many explicitly critiqued the gap between official pro-
nouncements of law and the guarantees of justice and equality contained in the Constitu-
tion and Declaration of Independence.33 Their appeals to rights were not born of naiveté 
or deluded faith in the law: the individual letter writers had few options open to them for 
meaningful resistance.34 They were lodging critiques of governments with formidable 
coercive power, and were often facing not merely abstract threats, but actual violence 
from governing officials.35 They nonetheless denounced government’s actions and in-
sisted that they were entitled to better.36 Rather than confusing them into quiescence, 
Lovell argues that the idea of rights provided a conceptual framework through which 
people could construct demands for change, and emboldened the letter writers to make 
them.37 
One important implication of Lovell’s impressive study is that the significance or 
political value of rights talk should be judged in part by the degree to which it enhances 
and legitimates the act of making demands, not only the degree to which those demands 
are ultimately met. Lovell insists that the capacity of relatively powerless people to make 
demands for change is itself valuable.38 “The people do not always get what they need 
                                                	   27.	  	   Id.	   at	   20	   (quoting	   STUART	   A.	   SCHEINGOLD,	   THE	   POLITICS	   OF	   RIGHTS:	   LAWYERS,	   PUBLIC	   POLICY,	   AND	  POLITICAL	  CHANGE	  5-­‐6	  (2d	  ed.	  2004)).	  	  	   28.	  	   LOVELL,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  20.	  	   29.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  32-­‐33,	  140-­‐41.	  	   30.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  32-­‐33.	  	   31.	  	   Id.	  at	  145.	  	   32.	  	   Id.	  at	  20.	  	   33.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  122-­‐23.	  	   34.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  195-­‐98.	  	   35.	  	   Id.	  	   36.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  198.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  32.	  	   38.	  	   LOVELL,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  205.	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the first time they ask, but they would never get anything if they stopped looking for res-
onant ways of articulating novel demands.”39 This insight is, as Lovell notes, an exten-
sion of the work of critical race theorists who have defended antidiscrimination law as a 
limited, but nonetheless valuable, mechanism of resistance for those who had few others 
at their disposal.40 It is also a relative of Michael McCann’s work on the way that the pay 
equity movement mobilized its members around legal claims and rights-based rhetoric, 
making effective use of rights talk even in the absence of robust judicial support.41 Of 
course, it is very difficult to demonstrate that rights talk enables people to make claims 
they would not otherwise make using a different linguistic or ideational framework, yet 
the study of rights as claim-enabling will surely benefit from This is Not Civil Rights and 
from further work in the direction it indicates. 
People’s ability to make demands on government is also at the core of Ronald Kro-
toszynski’s book Reclaiming the Petition Clause.42 It calls our attention to the difficulties 
of demanding things from a government willing to exercise its coercive power, particu-
larly, Krotoszynski notes, for the purpose of quelling dissent.43 Krotoszynski focuses on 
government’s ability to suppress mass protest by limiting the physical spaces to which 
protestors have access, thereby shielding public officials and high-profile events from 
their message and blunting their impact.44 Krotoszynski argues that it is now standard 
practice for American officials, citing security concerns, to relegate protestors to such 
remote locations that they are effectively blocked from access to public figures and the 
journalists covering them.45 While Lovell studies the content and context of novel rights 
claims from a forgotten period in the history of American civil rights, Krotoszynski ad-
vances a novel rights claim of his own, drawing from a neglected historical tradition for 
the purpose of bolstering his claim that his is the correct interpretation of the First 
Amendment. 
Krotoszynski’s central argument is that the First Amendment contains a yet-to-be 
recognized right of access to one’s governing officials, and that, notwithstanding the Su-
preme Court’s approval, the practice of confining protestors in low-visibility locations 
allows governments to hold free speech “hostage to security concerns”46 and violates the 
Constitution.47 What makes this rights claim novel is that Krotoszynski grounds it in the 
First Amendment, which protects “the right of the people . . . to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”48 Though the Supreme Court’s doctrine has typically de-
clined to endow this mention of petitioning with a legal significance distinct from the 
rest of the First Amendment’s guarantees, Krotoszynski argues that this clause should be 
                                                	   39.	  	   Id.	  
 40.	  	   Id.	  at	  195	  (citing	  Kimberlé	  Williams	  Crenshaw,	  Race,	  Reform,	  and	  Retrenchment:	  Transformation	  
and	  Legitimation	  in	  Antidiscrimination	  Law,	  101	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1331,	  1335	  (1988)).	  	  	   41.	  	   	  MICHAEL	  W.	  MCCANN,	  RIGHTS	  AT	  WORK:	  PAY	  EQUITY	  REFORM	  AND	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  LEGAL	  MOBILIZATION	  4	  (1994).	  	  	   42.	  	   See	  generally	  KROTOSZYNSKI,	  supra	  note	  4.	  	   43.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  23.	  	   44.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  213-­‐15.	  	   45.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  x-­‐xii,	  31-­‐33.	  	   46.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	   47.	  	   Id.	  at	  208-­‐09.	  	   48.	  	   Id.	  at	  5	  (quoting	  U.S.	  CONST.	  amend.	  I).	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read as independent protection of protestors’ rights to be seen and heard directly by the 
officials at whom they target their protests.49 The book proceeds by first describing the 
gravity of the deprivation,50 the growing marginalization of dissent,51 and the disappear-
ance of public space for its collective expression.52 The next section of the book sketches 
the history of the Anglo-American right of petition and offers New Zealand’s political 
system as an example of the way that political petitioning can be meaningfully incorpo-
rated into the functioning of a contemporary political system.53 In the final sections of 
the book, Krotoszynski proposes a new American constitutional doctrine to protect peti-
tioning and describes a jurisprudential approach judges might use in the enforcement of 
this new First Amendment doctrine.54 
The book begins by calling attention to the severe consequences of the existing 
First Amendment doctrine for protestors who attempt to maintain a physical presence in 
American political life.55 Chapter Two opens with a physical description of the designat-
ed protest zone, or “DZ,” that the City of Boston erected in preparation for the 2004 
Democratic National Convention.56 A federal district judge and the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals both deemed this DZ system a constitutionally permissible restriction on speech, 
finding that the restriction was neutral with respect to the content of the speech, and reg-
ulated only its time, place, and manner.57 Krotoszynski successfully problematizes this 
understanding by juxtaposing it with a physical description of the DZ.58 This zone, the 
only lawful site near the convention where groups of over twenty people could engage in 
protest activities, was concealed beneath unused railroad tracks, which were looped with 
razor wire.59 It was patrolled by armed police and national guardsmen, and surrounded 
by concrete barriers topped by an eight-foot high chain link fence, complete with a mesh 
wall, which obscured the view of protesters and passersby.60 Even independent of other 
evidence, the prison-like enclosure into which protesters were corralled suggests that this 
regulation of the physical space available for protest was not a benign security restriction 
that evenhandedly balanced dissenters’ speech rights with concerns about public safety. 
Krotoszynski further condemns such restrictions on protest activity by likening 
these modern-day restrictions to the thoroughly discredited practice of banning seditious 
libel and thereby criminalizing the criticism of the government.61 He points out that, in 
both cases, the government officials who regulated dissenting speech insisted that securi-
ty concerns necessitated these regulations.62 Of course, the advocates of bans on sedi-
                                                	   49.	  	   Id.	  at	  6.	  	   50.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  ix-­‐xiii.	  	   51.	  	   Id.	  at	  1.	  	   52.	  	   Id.	  at	  20.	  	   53.	  	   Id.	  at	  81-­‐82.	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  at	  182-­‐84.	  	  	   55.	  	   Id.	  at	  1-­‐4.	  	   56.	  	   Id.	  at	  20-­‐21.	  	   57.	  	   Coal.	  to	  Protest	  the	  Democratic	  Nat’l	  Convention	  v.	  City	  of	  Boston,	  327	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  61,	  69-­‐71	  (D.	  Mass.	  2004),	  aff’d	  sub	  nom.	  Bl(a)ck	  Tea	  Soc’y	  v.	  City	  of	  Boston,	  378	  F.3d	  8,	  12,	  15	  (1st	  Cir.	  2004).	  	   58.	  	   See	  KROTOSZYNSKI,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  20-­‐21.	  	   59.	  	   Id.	  at	  21.	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  at	  20-­‐21.	  	   61.	  	   Id.	  at	  6-­‐8.	  	   62.	  	   Id.	  at	  7.	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tious libel argued that it was criticism of government that endangered national security, 
while advocates of restrictions on protestors are, purportedly, attempting to regulate only 
the time, place, and manner of protest activities, and not attempting to exclude the dis-
senting ideas from broader circulation. Yet Krotoszynski argues that security concerns 
are a convenient cloak under which governing officials can hide their desire to quash dis-
senting speech.63 He points out that when large groups gather for activities that govern-
ments condone, they adopt a very different set of responses to potential security threats.64 
In addition, restrictions on protests in particular places may be facially content-neutral, 
but the large groups of people likely to gather outside these events are likely to be dis-
senters.65 Thus, Krotoszynski argues, in the context of real-life politics, restrictions on 
the time, place, and manner of protest can hardly be disentangled from the content-based 
restrictions that characterized the law of seditious libel.66 This may all be true, but the 
analogy remains an imperfect one. Criminalizing one particular (albeit powerful) form of 
an idea’s expression is surely less oppressive than criminalizing the expression of that 
idea in any form. Krotoszynski does not even need to equate modern restrictions on pro-
test with laws banning seditious libel, however, because his analysis of the shortcomings 
of the time, place, and manner doctrine are so thoroughly convincing. 
The core of this First Amendment construction is the marketplace of ideas meta-
phor, which holds that the freedom of speech is so important because truth emerges over 
time through the unrestricted competition between opposing ideas.67 When all ideas are 
allowed to enter the marketplace, they battle one another for adherents, falsities are top-
pled in these battles or sheared off of otherwise sound conceptions, and the best argu-
ments emerge victorious. As American jurists have envisioned it, this marketplace is re-
ally just a metaphor for a conversation conducted over extended time-spans, 
predominantly in writing. The exchange of scientific articles is a quintessential example 
of such a marketplace, and the metaphor entered Supreme Court doctrine primarily in 
defense of pamphleteers. Thus, Americans’ metaphorical marketplace of ideas can be 
entered through many different channels (or places to write about one’s ideas). As a re-
sult, restrictions on gathering in particular places to protest do not appear to threaten the 
core of American free speech, since the metaphorical marketplace remains so easily ac-
cessible. 
Krotoszynski highlights the limitations of the marketplace of ideas metaphor by 
drawing our attention to the physical element of political protest, and the neglected sig-
nificance of where and to whom political ideas get expressed.68 He points out that public 
protest is not simply about ideas, but about the strength and urgency of opposition.69 
Mass protests create an emotional experience that has the capacity to change the minds 
of both governing officials and private spectators who witness these protests either in 
person or through media coverage. Being forced to confront large gatherings of dissent-
                                                	   63.	  	   Id.	  	   64.	  	   Id.	  at	  55-­‐57.	  	   65.	  	   Id.	  at	  27-­‐31.	  	   66.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	  	   67.	  	   Id.	  at	  50-­‐51.	  	   68.	  	   Id.	  at	  18.	  	   69.	  	   Id.	  at	  170-­‐71.	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ers, he insists, is different from simply reading about their objections.70 Restrictions on 
visible public protests, therefore, may well hamper dissenters’ ability to convey their 
message, even if their disembodied ideas can still compete in an abstract marketplace. 
Yet the marketplace of ideas metaphor exerts such a hold on free speech doctrine that 
courts have generally not recognized protesters’ physical access to high-profile events 
and political actors as protected by the First Amendment. 
Convinced that existing doctrine holds little promise of protection for protesters, 
Krotoszynski turns to a neglected Anglo-American rights tradition, the right to petition, 
and argues that “[t]he Petition Clause represents the most logical textual basis for secur-
ing a right of citizen access to government . . . .”71 Direct access to one’s government, 
Krotoszynski argues, was central to the English practice of petitioning.72 By 1377, peti-
tioning at the foot of the throne was a well-accepted means of seeking redress from the 
King and, as Parliament gained independence, people increasingly directed petitions to 
Parliament.73 “By the early 1700s, petitioning had come to be viewed as the birthright of 
the English subject,”74 and Krotoszynski argues that the right to petition the King and 
Parliament was even more robust in the American Colonies, and remained fundamental 
following independence.75 Quaker abolitionists employed petitions particularly vigorous-
ly, leading the antebellum Congress to debate the nature of the right to petition, and 
whether it required Congress to entertain or even respond to all of the petitions it re-
ceived.76 The nineteenth century women’s suffrage and temperance movements also em-
ployed large-scale drives to collect signatures as a staple of their successful efforts to 
move policy.77 Krotoszynski reminds us of these prominent uses of legislative petition-
ing in American history, and in the same chapter, turns to New Zealand, where the legis-
lature still regularly entertains citizens’ petitions.78 He offers New Zealand as a demon-
stration that the practice of petitioning can be successfully incorporated into modern-day 
governance as well.79  
Krotoszynski’s central focus is not the written communications with the legislature 
that characterize New Zealand’s right to petition, but the in-person protest of high-profile 
institutions or events. He seeks to convince his readers to see these protests as petitions 
that should be protected under the First Amendment. He argues that his view of protests 
as petitions is consistent with historical practice in the United States (at least from the 
1830s onward), since the collection of petition signatures was widely coupled with other 
forms of expression, particularly mass demonstrations and parades.80 He characterizes 
this form of political participation as a “hybrid activity that married multiple forms of 
expressive freedom into a single whole. . . . [T]his hybrid activity involved petitioning, 
                                                	   70.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  174-­‐75.	  	  	   71.	  	   Id.	  at	  208.	  	   72.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  83-­‐90.	  	   73.	  	   Id.	  at	  85.	  	  	   74.	  	   Id.	  at	  87.	  	   75.	  	   Id.	  at	  104,	  108.	  	   76.	  	   Id.	  at	  114-­‐20.	  	  	   77.	  	   Id.	  at	  121-­‐23.	  	   78.	  	   Id.	  at	  137,	  139.	  	   79.	  	   Id.	  at	  149-­‐52.	  	   80.	  	   Id.	  at	  127.	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annexed to speech, assembly, and association, with the goal of engaging the government, 
through public protest, and also the media . . . .”81 He concludes that public protests that 
intend to engage government and the media in order to call attention to a particular 
grievance and seek policy change deserve protection under the Petition Clause.82 The 
Selma to Montgomery March of 1965, to which Krotoszynski devotes an entire chapter, 
is for him, a paradigmatic example of a modern-day protest/petition.83 The four-day, fif-
ty-two mile march84 culminated on the capitol steps with an attempt to meet with the 
state’s segregationist governor, George Wallace.85 This protest framed both a direct en-
treaty to the Governor and the larger conversation about violations of African Ameri-
cans’ civil rights.86 
Krotoszynski also notes that this quintessential and substantively important protest 
would not have been able to proceed without the protection of the federal judiciary, and 
uses Federal District Judge Frank Johnson’s decision in Williams v. Wallace,87 which 
granted an injunction authorizing the march, as an example of the way that judges should 
enforce the right to petition.88 The part of Judge Johnson’s opinion in Williams that Kro-
toszynski finds so useful as a model for protection of the right to petition is Johnson’s 
“proportionality principle,” which is a balancing test used to determine when a public 
protest is protected under the First Amendment.89 Using this principle, the right to peti-
tion is commensurate with the particular grievances for which the petitioners in question 
seek redress.90 
Of course, this kind of balancing test relies on judges to determine the extent of the 
harms inflicted by government on each group of would-be protestors, but Krotoszynski 
seeks to reassure us that such determinations do not rely too heavily on judges’ subjec-
tive assessments.91 He acknowledges that judges will necessarily have discretionary 
power when determining what amount of access is proportional to the wrongdoing that 
petitioners have suffered, but points out quite rightly that existing First Amendment doc-
trine already hinges on subjective distinctions, such as the difference between conduct 
and expressive activity.92 Instead of continuing to emphasize the subjectivity inherent in 
constitutional doctrines, however, Krotoszynski insists that the proportionality principle 
can occupy a legal space in which subjective determinations about which groups deserve 
protection will be minimized by a rigorous examination of the merits of their claims.93 
Thus, he argues that “it is difficult to see how [the proportionality principle] could serve 
as a vehicle for permitting judges to implement their arbitrary or narrow ideological poli-
                                                	   81.	  	   Id.	  at	  165-­‐66.	  	   82.	  	   Id.	  at	  182-­‐83.	  	   83.	  	   Id.	  at	  185.	  	   84.	  	   Id.	  at	  186.	  	   85.	  	   Id.	  at	  12.	  	   86.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  12-­‐13.	  	   87.	  	   Williams	  v.	  Wallace,	  240	  F.	  Supp.	  100	  (M.D.	  Ala.	  1965).	  	   88.	  	   KROTOSZYNSKI,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  193-­‐95,	  206.	  	   89.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  206.	  	   90.	  	   Id.	  	   91.	  	   Id.	  at	  205.	  	   92.	  	   Id.	  at	  204-­‐05.	  	   93.	  	   Id.	  at	  204.	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cy preferences.”94 This conclusion is particularly surprising in light of Krotoszynski’s 
repeated references to the criminalization of seditious libel, a practice that has fallen into 
disrepute in large part because its history so clearly highlights the difficulty, if not im-
possibility, of disentangling legal judgment from the partisan and ideological lenses 
through which people, including judges, perceive the world. At times, Krotoszynski 
seems to acknowledge that what he is really proposing is a trade-off: the introduction of 
a First Amendment doctrine that will give judges the opportunity to intervene on behalf 
of those protestors that they recognize as genuinely aggrieved with the cost that such 
recognition will hinge on necessarily subjective and prejudiced choices. He seems to 
suggest that because it would provide increased protections for at least some protestors, 
this solution would certainly be no worse than the current jurisprudential model, under 
which no protesters are granted direct access to governing officials and the media outlets 
that follow them. The claim that enhanced access for some protest groups is normatively 
preferable to extremely limited access for all such groups requires careful justification, 
which seems to be beyond the scope of this wide-ranging and provocative proposal for a 
new judicially enforced right to petition through mass protest. 
Krotoszynski crafts a creative and persuasive rights claim for members of the legal 
elite to employ, while Lovell documents the capacity of isolated and often marginalized 
laypeople to respond to injustice with similarly new and expansive rights claims. Both do 
this by revisiting lost sites of rights-claiming. Although these books study rights claims 
of very different kinds, in very different contexts, they both highlight the centrality of 
people’s intended audience to their choice of how to express their demands. Lovell ar-
gues that people employ rights language and insist on the moral adequacy of law because 
they are attempting to persuade governing officials to act, not necessarily because their 
thinking is trapped within this conceptual framework.95 Similarly, Krotoszynski argues 
that mass protests are as much about confronting an intended audience as they are about 
the expression of particular ideas.96 Read together, these works suggest that to fully un-
derstand political action, it may be necessary to identify the audience it is intended to 
reach.	  
                                                	   94.	  	   Id.	  at	  205.	  	   95.	  	   See	  LOVELL,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  x-­‐xii.	  	   96.	  	   See	  KROTOSZYNSKI,	  supra	  note	  4,	  at	  12.	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